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Abstract:  I detect at least two unspoken assumptions in Birch’s project, and I question, indeed, 
reject both of them. One is that welfare is the primary concern of animal ethics. I think liberation 
is. Birch’s other assumption is that the scientific investigation of animal sentience is key to 
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I tend to think of philosophy as an inquiry into unexamined assumptions. The result is that I often 
seem to be changing the subject. Jonathan Birch (2017) has presented a cogent argument for 
refining the application of science to questions of animal welfare and even provided a preliminary 
program. But I don’t want to talk about that. I detect at least two unspoken assumptions in Birch’s 
project, and I question, indeed, reject both of them. One is that welfare is the primary concern of 
animal ethics. I think liberation is. Birch’s other assumption is that the scientific investigation of 
animal sentience is key to promoting animal ethics. I think science is largely irrelevant to progress 
on this front and can even be counterproductive. 
 For me animal ethics is a very simple matter. It’s about the onslaught by human beings on 
all other animals in their natural state in the wild. Encroachment and domestication are the 
culprits. Encroachment has led to depopulation by denial of habitats and excessive hunting and 
fishing due to human overpopulation and arbitrary dietary choices. Domestication has led to the 
creation of a massive population of enslaved, exploited, and immiserated sentient beings, who 
have become dependent on us and are either killed in their youth or, if maintained as pets into 
adulthood, infantilized. 
 Again, even the solution is simple. The injunction I would address to us humans is: Use 
birth control, go vegan, follow a healthy lifestyle (in other words, let medicine be more about 
prevention and public health), adopt only shelter animals as pets, and so forth. Of course, putting 
all of these practices into worldwide effect would not be simple at all, and might very well involve 
Animal Sentience 2017.027:  Marks on Birch on Precautionary Principle 
2 
 
scientific research. But my point here is only that scientific research into animal sentience has 
little if anything to do with this program. 
 More directly to the point of Birch’s target article, the simple truth of animal ethics is that 
the sentience of the animals most exploited and in need of liberation from human tyranny is not 
in any doubt that requires or would even benefit from scientific scrutiny. Animals in the wild are 
clearly sentient in the sense that they populate habitats that are sufficiently complex to demand 
intelligence and sensitivity to survive and thrive in. Meanwhile, the domestic exploitation of 
animals is mainly about chickens (Marino 2017), and anybody who doubts their sentience need 
only talk to Karen Davis or visit her sanctuary in Machipongo, Virginia. 
 I don’t want to sound like an obscurantist. I love science. I also love music; but I don’t want 
us to be fiddling while Rome burns. Animal ethics concerns a pressing, perhaps the most pressing 
ethical issue of our time: the immiseration and slaughter or extinction by human agency of 
sentient beings on an unprecedented scale. Much work, including of the mind, needs urgently to 
be done. But fine-tuning the treatment of confined or captured animals by the scientific 
investigation of sentience is not part of it, it seems to me. 
 Birch’s target article is admirable in that it does focus attention on large neglected 
populations, in particular, fish and other aquatic animals. However, even here my objection 
stands, and for several reasons. One is that the kind of scientific investigation engaged in to 
determine whether an animal is sentient, in Birch’s sense of being sensitive to pain or distress (or 
joy etc.), usually itself involves the infliction of what would be painful if the animal were sentient 
… and sometimes finally killing the animal. See, for example, work on fish sentience described by 
Braithwaite (2010). Another is that, as Birch tells us, this field is in its infancy, and so we must 
think of a proper inventory of the sentient world as “a long-term goal for animal sentience 
research” (although he balances this by noting that “the most exploited orders … tend to be the 
most studied”). 
 But my main objection remains: it is concerning the starting assumption that these are 
even hard cases requiring scientific investigation. For example, Birch mentions “many orders of 
mollusc … for which the burden of proof has not yet been attained.” This happens to be something 
I grappled with myself a while back when I was pondering whether dietary vegans might be able 
to benefit from a loophole. (See also Fleischman 2013.) A remark by Peter Singer and Jim Mason 
(2006) had caught my eye: 
 
“… with the bivalves, the evidence for consciousness is barely stronger than it is in plants…. Ethical 
arguments against eating animals that are based on not causing — or not risking causing —
suffering therefore get little grip on eating oysters, clams, and scallops …” (p. 133). 
 
Meanwhile I had learned that these animals are particularly rich in nutrients that an 
unsupplemented vegan diet lacks. Why not, then, revise the notion of vegan to exclude not all 
animals (and animal products) but only sentient ones? (An alternative conceptual possibility 
would be to revise the notion of “animal” to denote only sentient beings.) 
 However, I soon faced the very issue Birch addresses, namely, how to know with 
reasonable assurance whether these beings are sentient. (Singer [1990, p. 174] himself had 
expressed more doubt about the denial in an earlier publication, therein embracing a 
precautionary principle.) So I asked myself: How do I know that anything (other than myself) is 
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sentient? The answer that came to me was by their behavior, especially their motility. And I 
suddenly realized that I had no idea what bivalve behavior (if any) was like. 
 This being the Internet Age, I then thought to investigate the matter on YouTube. In a 
matter of minutes, my jaw was dropping from what I observed in amateur videos (of clams and 
scallops moving, if not so much oysters). I even sent some links to Singer, who replied that “the 
videos do serve to indicate that the doubt is genuine, which suggests we should give it more 
weight, when we have no real need to eat them” (personal communication, December 14, 2013). 
I myself was moved beyond doubt by what I saw. Call me naïve, but I don’t think I bring any more 
bias to my everyday observations than scientists, singly or en masse, bring to their experiments. 
 I don’t want to defend naïve perception against science, however, since, as I say, I love 
science. The point is rather that, for ethical purposes and goals, science is not always the best 
tool. After all, animal experimenters keep announcing more and more startling (to them) 
revelations about how smart and sensitive various other species are; but does that result in any 
but the most grudging institutional changes? Will psychologists studying empathy in rats and mice 
ever stop withholding their own empathy toward the rats and mice on whom they perform clever 
but cruel experiments to reveal the rodents’ empathy? Such absurdities are the rule not the 
exception in animal research of the kind in question. 
 
For me a smoking gun sentence in Birch’s paper is this one: 
 
“If an animal is not regarded as sentient, practices that would be considered clearly inhumane if 
performed on a vertebrate, such as the removal of limbs without anesthetic or analgesic, may be 
allowed to persist.” 
 
As I read this sentence, it implies that removing the limbs of an animal (not to mention the 
conditions of confinement and other cruel treatment and then, typically, being killed) could be 
humane, provided it is done “painlessly.” What science could possibly alter such an assumption? 
Something quite different is needed, I’d say: an epiphany, as it were, or, to use Dorothy Day’s 
(and Gary Francione’s) phrase, “a revolution of the heart.” 
The science we do need for animal ethics is how to bring Homo sapiens to its senses about 
other species (as well as our own, of course); see for example Cooney (2011). How can we 
overcome the fundamental contradiction that permits us to be complicit in unending cruelty 
toward beings whom we are fully capable of loving? 
Now, it is possible that my objections are guilty of an ignoratio. I did acknowledge at the 
outset that I might be changing the subject. Was it appropriate for me to do so? Birch’s concern 
is specifically to increase the scope of “animal protective legislation.” And it may just be a sad fact 
that scientific backing is required to make one’s case before legislative bodies. So even though a 
child knows that other species are sentient, both scientists and legislators require hard data to be 
convinced. (I myself don’t know what to say about oysters.) 
Well, perhaps that is true in some cases. But I would hardly judge contemporary U.S. 
politics, anyway, by that standard. (Allen [2006] has also expressed some skepticism about the 
efficacy of animal ethicists’ way of invoking science.) The Animal Welfare Act is the most obvious 
case in point: It was inspired by an article about dogs in Life magazine (Perry 2006). That’s what 
sells newspapers, and apparently that’s what moves legislation also. Plus, horse trading and other 
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shenanigans … and maybe some hard science, but also pseudoscience, as part of the mix. And I 
dare say that the change of attitude becoming apparent among younger biomedical 
experimenters has more to do with what they learned from PETA and Mercy for Animals and 
Vegan Outreach and HSUS and the Humane League et al. about how animals are treated than 
what they learned from their textbooks and teachers about which animals are sentient. 
Animal ethics as I conceive it is not in the business of determining what is sentient and 
who needs protection (who is “morally considerable”), but needs to focus much more on the 
strategy and tactics of protecting the sentient. Animal ethics no more needs science to prove 
things than the abolition of slavery needed theology … although, as I am granting, the animal 
movement could conceivably be served instrumentally by marketing and other sciences of 
persuasion (but also the work of gifted artists and filmmakers), just as emancipation and the civil 
rights movement were served by the church (when it wasn’t opposing them!). 
But suppose the science of sentience would be helpful. There remains my other objection 
to Birch’s paper, namely, its assumption that animal ethics is about animal welfare. For Birch 
considers it an endorsement of his proposal that: 
 
“… it is well-aligned with existing views on this question in animal welfare science. The proposal 
can thus be seen as articulating and making precise what I take to be the conventional wisdom in 
large areas of the field, rather than as calling for substantial changes to current practice.” 
 
That for me is a rebuttal! Here is another smoking gun sentence: 
 
“One might suppose, at first glance, that an animal’s pain, though surely bad, is not a bad outcome 
on a large enough scale to justify precautionary reasoning. This can be rebutted, however, by 
noting some relevant figures. For example, if our policy target is the treatment of fish by 
commercial fisheries, we should note that approximately 1 to 3 trillion fish are caught annually in 
wild fisheries, excluding fish farms (Mood and Brook 2010; Balcombe 2016; Jones 2016). If we fail 
to regulate effectively the way fish are treated, the threat to animal welfare is not simply that one 
animal will be subjected to preventable pain, but that over one trillion animals per year will.” 
 
As heartened as I was to see this exceedingly disheartening number cited by Birch, I could not 
help but notice that there is not a hint in the passage that the killing of these trillions of sentient 
beings is itself an ethical issue. Birch appears, then, to fall in with the prevailing view among 
animal welfare theorists that death is not a welfare issue. (Consider for example the much-cited 
Five Freedoms [FAWC 2009, pp. 1-2], which oh-so-conveniently omit the freedom to go on living.) 
This view certainly need not be granted; see for example Yeates (2010). But if it were, as Birch 
appears to do, then all the more reason to reject animal welfare as the touchstone of animal 
ethics. 
Birch’s conservative bent with regard to animal ethics is well-illustrated by his own 
extended example of the EU’s rejection of including decapod crustaceans in an animal protection 
directive, despite the scientific evidence of sentience considered, due to “fierce resistance from 
the biomedical research community.” Indeed, the scientific evidence itself went back and forth. 
Nonetheless, Birch found support for his project in this process. 
Another of his extended examples pertains to the Replacement component of the Three 
Rs (“reduce, refine and replace”) of animal welfare in biomedical research. While suggesting (by 
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aptly putting “lower” in scare quotes when referring to some animals) that the very notion of 
hierarchizing extant species is problematic, Birch nevertheless seems to accept the common use 
of “replacement” in biomedical research to refer to the substitution of one species for another. 
But the way he does so is actually twice removed from the original intent, judging by the 
authoritative definitions given at NC3RS: 
 
Replacement refers to technologies or approaches which directly replace or avoid the use of 
animals in experiments where they would otherwise have been used. 
 
Full replacement avoids the use of any research animals. It includes the use of human volunteers, 
tissues and cells, mathematical and computer models, and established cell lines.   
 
Partial replacement includes the use of some animals that, based on current scientific thinking, 
are not considered capable of experiencing suffering. 
 
For Birch not only accepts partial replacement, which in my opinion is already a bastardization of 
“replacement,” but allows (with parenthetical reservations) that it may be “appropriate” and 
“reasonable” to substitute a species with a less “rich” or “complex” form of sentience for one 
having more. Yet recall that Birch’s own usage of “sentience” implies hedonic sensibility; so this 
violates even the definition of “partial replacement” cited above. 
The main problem with animal welfare as a touchstone, however, is that it is honored in 
the breach. It serves animal industries as a convenient sop to citizen and consumer conscience. It 
is far from clear that animals are better off after all these years of institutionalized welfarism, or 
– if some are marginally better off – whether this is offset by ever more of them being immiserized 
and killed. And from Birch’s own exposition of how he would advise the use of replacement in 
biomedical research, for example: 
 
“It is possible in principle to bring decapods within the scope of animal protection law while 
ensuring that there are still incentives to use them in preference to fish ….” 
 
it came across to this reader that it was, in the end, only a way of making current practice (or 
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